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Abstract
This starting point of this paper is the difficulty for many graduate students to
ever finish a Ph. D. and the graduate student ￿s need for good research ideas.
According to Swedish data, only 20 percent of those who start as graduate
students in the social sciences ever finish. One crucial problem is probably the
lack of ideas and awareness of how to foster creativity. What are good ideas?
Ideas are assessed all the time, by journal editors and referees, by research
councils and thesis supervisors. Yet, there is little reflection on the question of
what constitutes good ideas, and bad. Philosophy of science is briefly
discussed in the paper, with examples from behaviorism and social
constructivism, and it is argued that it provides no good basis for generating
and assessing good ideas. The paper then proceeds by discussing examples of
good, and not-so-good ideas. The notion of good bad ideas is introduced and
an example is given. The paper then discusses several questions. Which
characteristics of research ideas make them good, and which make them less
good? How does one go about creating good ideas? What sort of research
environment is most likely to stimulate the growth of good ideas? What are the
processes which kill creativity in research? Creativity requires an open mind
and strong interest. It takes time, sometimes much time, before good ideas
arrive. Yet, success in a research career requires publications, and a brief
section discusses how to plan one ￿s publications and have them accepted by
journal editors. Finally, Swedish experience with an attempt to reform
graduate education is discussed. It is pointed out that administrators ￿
inclinations to favor concrete policy measures such as financing do not
necessarily lead to the desired consequences of increasing completion rate and
decreasing study time. Another approach must be applied: the fostering of
creativity.
Key words: graduate education, creativity, assessment of research ideas2. It has been pointed out to me that some doctoral students have very small chances to bring
up and work on their own ideas, since they are employed in their supervisor ￿s projects. If this is true,
it is a very different approach to graduate education which is not discussed in the present paper. 
3. These data pertain to the situation before 1998 when a reform was implemented; the effects
of that reform, if any, have not yet been documented. 
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Introduction
The occasion for writing the present paper arose in graduate education. I have much
experience in supervising the research of doctoral students, yet before writing this paper I had
reflected fairly little on how it should be done. What are good and what are bad ideas, and
how do you get and develop them? This paper is, however, not written from the standpoint of
supervision, but mostly from the standpoint of the student. I assume throughout that the
student strives to generate his or her own ideas, an assumption which is not always true. So,
clearly there are several topics I could not deal with here which are important and related to
the general theme of how to launch a research career. Hopefully, the present paper is a piece
of the puzzle. 
The paper is attuned to conditions in graduate study in Sweden. Some details may be specific
to that country, but in most respects I think the discussion is general enough to be of some
interest in other contexts as well. In addition, the discussion is geared towards psychology and
some parts of it may be special to that discipline, or to a group of social science disciplines. 
Are you looking for a good idea for a thesis in psychology? Is it hard to come up with one?
This paper will tell you why, point to examples of good ideas, as well as examples of not-so-
good ideas and what distinguishes them. The paper discusses how ideas can be evaluated. It
will also try to tell you how to get good ideas, and how to develop them.
A basic assumption is that you are looking for good ideas for research. This is not so obvious
as it may sound. The current idea about Ph.D. work in Sweden assumes that a thesis is done
in two years. Very few manage to do that and the main problem is probably lack of workable
ideas. Thesis supervisors could of course provide such ideas
2. Yet, students want to work on
their own ideas. It takes a very long time for most students to develop a theme for a thesis,
and it is not a question of  ￿hard work ￿. It is a question of waiting for closure. I am convinced
that this is largely a waste of time. It is somewhat absurd that it could take 20 years to
complete a thesis, which has been known to happen. Some students never make it, in fact
only 20 percent of students accepted for graduate study in the social sciences in Sweden ever
take the Ph. D. degree
3. The process can be much faster, and much more efficient, provided
there is some insight into what it takes to generate ideas. The purpose of the present paper is
to serve as a basis for discussions which will help students work on the process, understand
what to avoid and what to strive for, and learn where and how workable ideas can be found. 
The process of thesis work is largely a question of mobilizing the right level of motivation.
This is no simple thing. Many students have an exaggerated respect for what it takes to be a3
researcher, and what it takes to pass the ultimate academic test, the Public Defense. I have
known students who had a high level of talent and motivation for research, yet could not face
the Public Defense. We touch here on personality problems that a thesis adviser cannot treat
and has no responsibility for. He or she is no therapist, and should not try to be one.  But one
thing that the supervisor can do is to boost morale and motivation by being supportive and
positive and genuinely interested in the student ￿s work, and give reasonably fast feedback on
manuscripts. The supervisor at times also has his or her own demons. The perfectionistic
supervisor will not let the student finish a thesis until it is 2 or 3 times above what is
reasonably required. In this way, the supervisor avoids being criticized by colleagues for
demanding too little from students. The students pay the price. 
Most examples of good and bad ideas in the present paper are from my own work, which is
currently concerned with risk perception and with emotional intelligence. A previous
monograph in Swedish discussed some of the issues of research strategy in more detail
(Sjöberg, 1977a). In other papers I have discussed related issues of substance and
methodology (Sjöberg, 1981, 1983, 1987, 2000a). The present paper is not an attempt to
summarize this previous work of mine, but more of a progress report.
Let the reader be aware that the author has spent more time than he should have, in assessing
research ideas. This has been a major part of my professional life for 30 years, as a thesis
adviser and also as a member of research councils and a referee for councils and scientific
journals. This kind of work is largely about assessing the value of ideas. Strangely enough,
there is very little explicit discussion in these contexts about just what is good, and what is
bad, and why.
Take as an example the aspect of  ￿theoretical basis ￿. I heard many times this criterion to be
proposed as a major aspect on which to assess research proposals. It sounds good, yes? Well,
it all depends on what is meant. It turned out that almost no applications for research funding
contained any critical remarks about theories, compared theories or suggested to work for the
critical, empirical, assessment of theories, or to create new theory. None of all that! Instead, a
passing grade was awarded whenever the applicant cited the right current theories, and
correctly referred what these august scientists had claimed.  ￿A theoretical basis ￿ turned out to
involve the use of theory as a justification and showing that one had read the current standard
references. There is nothing wrong with such reading, of course, but if research is to make
progress, reading must be critical. It must be critical in the scientific sense, it must question
the theories on empirical and conceptual grounds, not on ideological ones.
A few words about what will not be treated in the present paper are in order. Prescriptions for
research often emanate from theory of science and philosophy. Researchers in psychology
have indeed been very much pre-occupied by the question of what constitutes scientific
knowledge in psychology, and decades have been wasted on programmatic research in the
belief that it was  ￿scientific ￿. The best example is behavioristic learning research 1910-1960, 
50 years! During this time, the theoretical basis of the study of behavior was believed to be
found in studies of animal learning, presumably because even  ￿simple ￿ animals such as rats
exhibit the same basic processes as human beings, but can be studied in a more
straightforward, experimental manner. Some principles of behavior can perhaps be
established in this way, but the whole spectrum of human learning and information4
processing is missed. The reasons for the - to some - enormously attractive idea of animal
models were partly to be found in a behavioristic philosophy of science, and it is my
conviction that good research ideas are very unlikely to be found in that environment. Theory
of science has other merits, but it does not function as an idea generator, nor is it usually
intended as one. Let ￿s look at another example.
A second, and more current, example is social constructivism (Hacking, 2000). This is just
about the opposite of behaviorism and adherents of this approach to social and behavioral
science claim that all there is, is social construction. However, this is both true and false. It is
true that all our perceptions and constructs regarding the external world in all its aspects are
constructions, many or most of them perhaps even social constructions. We inherit them from
the culture we live in and seldom add much in the way of idiosyncracies. At the same time,
these constructs usually refer to an external world, there is something  ￿out there ￿. Take
political attitudes. Most people have political attitudes, e. g. in the form of likes and dislikes
of political parties or leaders. These attitudes can be studied by means of surveys or
interviews and in other ways as well, and we can reach certain conclusions about them. These
conclusions are social constructions, but they are not arbitrary or equally good no matter what
they contain. Some conclusions are closer to reality, and there is a reality  ￿out there ￿.
Research can improve and accumulate better and better knowledge about people ￿s attitudes,
even if nobody would seriously argue that we can arrive at the  ￿final truth ￿ about anything in
social science. Social constructivism often denies these banal truths about the external world,
and a conceptual world, and mixes them up, ending up in a totally nihilistic standpoint where
 ￿anything goes ￿ (Windschuttle, 1996). If there are no criteria, except perhaps linguistic
elegance and persuasive power, to assess the validity of research, it is hard to believe that
there can be progress. Indeed, the constructivist will say that the very idea of  ￿progress ￿ is
naive. But in my view, good ideas have a relationship to realities which are independent of
the ideas. Hence, I see little use for social constructivism. Windschuttle ￿s penetrating analysis
should be consulted in case you still believe in social constructivism (Windschuttle, 1996).
Sokal exposed the emperor as naked, in a very entertaining manner (Sokal & Bricmont,
1998).
A third example, from psychology, is related to social constructivism. Smedslund has argued,
for many years, that psychological research tends to be tautological, that the hypotheses tested
must be true by definition (Smedslund, 1991). The point is well taken at times, but should not
be exaggerated. There is much empirical research in psychology where it is not relevant
(Sjöberg, 1982, 1999a). Smedslund ￿s achievement is that he has made researchers observant
of the dangers of tautologies. It is interesting to reflect on whether the same argument can be
made in other disciplines. 
What is  ￿ good ￿ ?
The present paper talks about  ￿good ￿ ideas, not merely ideas. It is therefore necessary to
reflect on the meaning of  ￿good ￿. A good idea is new and original and it is related in an
interesting way to theoretical developments in the field and/or to practical problems. Usually,
a purely practical problem would not qualify as a good research idea, there need to be some
elements of general interest beyond a concrete application. There must also be intellectual4. The reason is mainly that graduate students ￿ research rarely is advanced enough to
contribute to theory. It takes a long time for a researcher to reach that stage. 
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challenge involved. This factor is essential for study interest (Sjöberg, 1985, 1997; Sjöberg &
Dahlstrand, 1987). In addition, I do not deal with purely theoretical developments in the
present paper, the ideas discussed must have, at least in principle, some empirical substance
4. 
A good idea is also a workable idea. It must be possible to make something of it, it should not
be too difficult to develop into an empirical application. The paper also deals with not-so-
good ideas and it suggests why such ideas are less promising. The reason for taking that
approach as well is that many students often come up with such less than useful ideas, on the
basis of folk psychology and common sense. 
The source of a good idea is usually a combination of knowledge of the literature and
practices in a subfield, specific theories and principles, common sense and the researcher ￿s
own phenomenology. But  beware, some ideas that seem good, aren ￿t! An example will serve
as a starter. 
A bad idea
Psychology students very often suggest, as a research topic, to study the effects of some kind
of psychotherapy. What ￿s wrong with that? There are many questionable aspects which need
to be discussed.
First, it is a superficial idea, usually not motivated by knowledge of the cutting edge of
therapy research. It is motivated by the student ￿s interest in a form of therapy, not interest in
the scientific basis of it. This is the wrong place to start research. One should start from the
therapy research literature, which is very extensive, and derive research topics from there.
This, in turn, is a big order and requires extensive and discriminating reading and skilful
judgment, not likely to be a possible and realistic goal for the student. 
Second, therapy research is quite hard to do well, and seldom within the resources available
to a student. It needs lengthy observations, and the cooperation of professionals who will
have to do a considerable amount of work in order to comply with the design requirements of
the study, and who may also be defensive about what they are doing. They are not necessarily
charmed by the idea of having a student from some university, and his or her professors, peek
into what they do for a living. Also, many therapists are hostile towards systematic research
and what it brings with it in terms of requirements for control groups and even measurement.
They feel that what they do is very important and valuable but they doubt that it can be
measured. A further practical complication is that patients need to form some homogeneous
diagnostic group. Most patients are not clear examples of such a group and it may therefore
take quite a long time before a group which is large enough is collected. 
Third, the simple question  ￿Does x-therapy have any effect? ￿ leaves me, and many thesis
supervisors, cold. There are literally thousands of studies of this type, and even if a new
minor project might add a piece of the puzzle, it is bound to be very minor. It also has no or6
very little intellectual challenge to it - it is too much of a purely practical question. Intellectual
challenge is a cornerstone of scientific interest (Sjöberg, 1997). 
The example illustrates how a bad idea arises out of non-scientific interests. There is nothing
wrong with such interests per se, they are just relatively unlikely to bear fruit in science.
Exceptions happen and will be discussed in a later section. 
Why is it so hard to be creative?
Can anyone be creative? Can anyone come up with good research ideas? Probably not, but
many can do it, including many who doubt their own capacity in this respect. There are
several obstacles, though.
First, there is the problem of excessive respect for and deference to authority. This is a very
common problem. Social science researchers (in Sweden, but probably everywhere) tend to
have a very high regard for  ￿theory ￿ which is fine up to a point, but not when excessive. The
great and well-known developers of social or behavioral theory are read, their messages
hopefully understood (when that is possible) and the student then goes on to repeat what those
famous people have written, only in a less clear and stimulating manner. He or she offers no
critical remarks, no new ideas and no plans for crucial experiments or other types of empirical
studies which could throw some light on the validity of these theories. Validity? Do I mean
they may actually be wrong? Yes, I do. The whole point of research is that of formulating and
testing theories, and improving on them whenever they fail empirically.  Naturally, any
empirical test is contingent on the validity of the procedures used in the test, such as scales
used for measuring crucially important concepts. These scales can be always criticized in
themselves. Research is always full of uncertainties, which is one reason why some people
rightly prefer to do something else. The student needs to be less intimidated by the
international luminaries in the field, and to feel a healthy lack of respect. They are all human,
and make many errors.
The idea of empirical tests is less innocent than it sounds. For many students it is not a natural
way of thinking. They prefer to judge a theory on other grounds, such as the persuasive power
of the theorists or how colorful applications of the theory are, and even how much they would
wish that things were the way the theory asserts them to be. 
Second, there is a problem of  ￿seeing the forest, in spite of all the trees ￿. The student risks to
be involved in a large number of problems of detail, which may be challenging but are not the
most crucial ones. Some of these problems are statistical. How should one carry out a
statistical analysis of one kind or another? Many problems of this type pertain to significance
testing, which is a class of data analysis procedures which has probably caused much more
harm than good to psychological research (Schmidt, 1996; Sjöberg, 1999b). There are two
reasons for this. The first, and most important, is that researchers have been blinded to the
much more important requirement of establishing the size of effects, not only if they are non-5. We knew that from the beginning, anyhow, and all that statistical hypothesis testing does is
to establish that the study design was powerful enough to let us  ￿discover ￿ it. Although we often talk
about randomness, we never really mean that events are without a cause (Sjöberg, 2002). We always
impose meaning and causal structure on events. 
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random in the sense that a random process is unlikely to have caused them
5.
The second reason why significance testing is destructive is that it takes time and energy from
more important issues. How to test significance is a thorny topic by itself, and if pursued it
will lead the researcher into a foggy marsh where only a fool would rush in. How important is
the common assumption of normal distributions? Nobody seems to know anymore, although I
was taught, in my graduate studies, that statistical tests were  ￿robust ￿. Well, that is not true
any more. They may be, or maybe not. 
This point is related to measurement more generally. Here is another aspect where my
graduate study was misleading. I was taught that measurement level is enormously important,
and that psychology must strive to develop new and better measurement methods (Stevens,
1951). What a waste of time that was! The simple methods we have serve us well, and even if
they have not been proven to yield interval measurements they are in all likelihood good
enough approximations. Anderson has shown, in a very extensive research program using
simple categorical rating methods, that data have patterns supporting this assertion (Sjöberg,
1966; Anderson, 1982; Anderson, 1996; Sjöberg, 1994). In addition, the scaling methods
devised by Stevens and Ekman, among others, in the 1950's and 1960's (Ekman & Sjöberg,
1965), turned out to carry with them their own very difficult problems (Sjöberg, 1971). There
was nothing straightforward, after all, about  ￿direct ￿ psychological measurement, as Ekman
called it (Ekman, 1958). 
The philosophical analysis of fundamental measurement is theoretically interesting but seems
to generate very few interesting empirical applications (Cliff, 1992). Unfortunately, some
statisticians currently stress the measurement issues. Since there is no good alternative to the
simple rating methods now used all over psychology, their criticism leads nowhere but may
deter researchers from using the simple and effective methods which do exist. 
Mathematical analysis is unsuitable to psychology because phenomena are prone to error
variability between individuals (usually enormously large) and also within individuals, across
trials or occasions (Sjöberg, 1977a). This  ￿error ￿ variability has little in common with random
processes but is almost always systematic. Simple linear models will suffice to account for
data in most situations, the real issue is not the weak deviations from linearity that can be
detected but how to get a better over-all fit, in other words how to increase correlations or
effect sizes (Sjöberg, 2003a).
Third, there is the problem of too little or too much self-confidence. Those who have little
self-confidence just cannot believe that there own ideas are worthy of bringing forward and
working on. This is a very common attitude. The situation is made worse by the academic
culture which often encourages an overly critical attitude. The academic seminar is a standard
setting for establishing a pecking order, for people to criticize each other from top to bottom.6. It is common in some social science disciplines in Sweden that this step is only seldom
taken, and that local groups prefer not to have their work assessed by outsiders. Some sociology
departments are like this, and it pertains even more to departments of business administration
(Sjöberg, in press) . While this certainly makes for avoiding some unpleasant criticism, it also makes
the whole research effort meaningless because very few people will pay any attention to it. 
8
There may be a gender factor involved, since men are more likely to assert themselves in this
way. No matter what, it discourages many students and intimidates them from developing
their own creative force. Almost all people have such a capability, but if discouraged, many
will just give up. 
It is obvious that the academic seminar must be a place for venting critical thoughts. This
could be done in a less threatening manner than what is often the case, however, and there
should be more awareness and reflection on the great risks for motivation. It is indeed
possible that a seminar leader who is a cordial and not terribly smart or knowledgeable person
is better for the students than a highly efficient and sharp person who immediately detects any
weaknesses. The students will get more information from the latter type, but they will also
risk losing their zest. From the former type, they get positive feedback which will sustain
them during the first difficult years of a research career, and function as emotional support
when they meet with the icy winds blowing on the academic tundra. I refer, for example, to
the anonymous referee ￿s reports they will get from international journals. They are sometimes
dripping with poison and very mean. There is no way around this, however, if the researchers
are to get their work read and attended to by the international community (Sjöberg, 1976,
1977b)
6. Experience of research is not enough, there must also be feedback if a researcher is
to develop a high level of achievement (Ericsson, 1999). 
How about too much self esteem? This risk has been discussed by Baumeister et al.
(Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). In my experience, it is not uncommon that
students have enormously high aspirations for their work. They aim for the sky. They are
hypercritical of the work of others, and also of their own ideas. They are mesmerized by the
idea that they will revolutionalize science. I don ￿t know from where they get such ideas. They
are seldom based on realistic self knowledge, for these are mostly people who achieve very
little indeed. They do not conform to deadlines and finishing a thesis will take not a year or
two extra but a decade or two above the stipulated time for completing the work. In addition,
when they finally complete a thesis, if at all, it is seldom particularly interesting or creative. It
may be  ￿water tight ￿, however, for many of these students are compulsive perfectionists.
Striving for the perfect is very dangerous because attention to details carries the risk of only
attending to details. Compulsive perfectionism is extremely counter-productive and it requires
personality change to get rid of it (Sapadin, 1999). The thesis adviser is no therapist, however,
and cannot take on that task. These people also see themselves as models of seriousness och
ambition and it takes many years before they realize that they spend their lives on trivial
details and get nothing of interest accomplished.
The fourth obstacle to creativity to be mentioned here is the reluctance to be integrated in an
intellectual community.  Some students see graduate studies and research as  ￿just another
job ￿. A recent survey at my own school talks about research and graduate study as a  ￿burden ￿.
It is something to do, at most, between 9 and 5, 5 days per week. There should be long9
holidays and vacations as well. But research does not function like that. Someone who sees
his or her research in this way should probably be doing something else. If there are to be
results, research cannot be turned on and off at will. It integrates with the whole person, and is
a way of life. The researcher does not care what time of the day it is, or if others are lying on
the beach. His mind is forever busy with his interests, and the interests will never let him go.
This may sound like a one-sided life and it is. The great scientists such as Sir Isaac Newton
have testified to having had this lifestyle (Tiner, 1981). Everyone cannot be a new Newton,
but that is not the point. The point is this: if research is seen as just another job, how can you
ever hope to accomplish anything beyond routine work? Research is a highly personal
activity, driven by inner motives of interest and the joy of getting new ideas, getting your own
ideas, and seeing them reach the international scientific community. The researcher also takes
interest in the wider environment, in his group of colleagues, even if they work on other
topics than his own. He or she finds time for that. In this way, a constructive environment is
created and sustained. 
I now turn to examples of good ideas. If nothing else, they will give the reader an idea of what
I think are good ideas. If he or she does not agree, this may be a fruitful ground for a debate. 
Examples of good ideas
Example 1: Test motivation
Here is a first example of an idea which may seem to be good, but there is perhaps some
hidden weakness in it. 
People take ability tests and the purpose is to measure their abilities. This has been going on
for about 100 years. A certain level of modest success has been achieved in this way.
Spearman formulated the g-factor theory saying that there was a general intelligence factor
common to all these tests. Thurstone, Guilford and Cattell followed in his footsteps. With
each new generation, the number of factors increased, but the basic technology of test
construction was unchanged and tests looked very much the same. The main development
was a remarkable proliferation of factors, and tests, but little improvement in understanding of
mental abilities and no improvement to speak of in practical achievements. 
Three radical ideas for improvement in ability testing now suggest themselves: to measure test
motivation, to investigate cognitive processes in detail and to switch from traditional test
items to the measurement of practical abilities or  ￿competencies ￿ (McClelland, 1973, 1998).
The first is still unchartered territory, the second is a junk yard of failed hopes and the third is
a story of merely modest success. 
It is hard to understand why ability testers have not long ago devised measures of test
motivation. In the neighboring field of self-report scales of personality, impression
management is measured, at least since the beginning of the 1960's (Crowne & Marlowe,
1960). New developments are still being published (Paulhus, 1991, 1998; Paulhus, Bruce, &
Trapnell, 1995; Paulhus & Reid, 1991). Faking is measurable and has been shown to fully
explain almost all of the enormous differences of self-report data in a real, high-stakes testing
situation and a situation where all data were guaranteed to be completely anonymous and7. Translated to dozens of languages, and sold in millions of copies all over the world. 
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would have absolutely no consequences for the testees (Sjöberg & Engelberg, 2002). Yet,
motivation in ability testing remains to be measured. How should we proceed with this good
idea?
It will not do to ask people how much of an effort they exerted, at least not as the sole
measure. Other ideas must be developed. How should it be done? Here is a suggestion. In a
multiple choice test a little motivated testee might be using stereotypical response patterns
based on position of the selected alternative and previous choices, such as alternating
responses. If the correct responses are strictly randomly distributed across response
alternatives, any non-randomness of incorrect responses would reveal a lack of effort. 
The idea could be tested against criteria of self-reported effort, experimental manipulations of
motivation by means of incentives enticing people to work hard, and in prediction where a
motivation score would contribute to the predictive value of the test. A given score should be
a stronger sign of underlying ability if it was achieved with little effort than if effort to
achieve it was very great. (On the other hand, the fact that someone invested only little effort
could mean that he or she has other undesirable characteristics as well...).
What ￿s wrong with this idea? If it had been workable, it should have been developed a long
time ago! Or, maybe not. Perhaps it is really original. Perhaps testers think in conventional
ways and they have therefore not pursued this unorthodox topic. Perhaps it is too alien to the
test community. Perhaps there is a general impression that testees usually all are highly
motivated and that there is so little variation among them that the motivation topic is not
worth pursuing. Be that as it may, the most likely answer is that the idea is, for some reason,
unworkable, because otherwise it would have been developed a long time ago. It is not that
original, after all. Or is it? 
Example 2: Emotional intelligence
The concept of emotional intelligence (EI) was introduced by Salovey, DiPaolo and Mayer in
1990 (Mayer, DiPaolo, & Salovey, 1990; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). It was an enormously 
powerful idea. They found that performance measures of such abilities as identifying
emotions could be constructed. Goleman caught the idea blowing in the wind, and wrote a
very successful book
7 (Goleman, 1995) where he put forward claims as to the very large
importance of emotional intelligence, seemingly credible to many of his readers. Others were
eager to jump on the band-wagon and suddenly we had a host of self-report tests of the
conventional kind, claiming to be tests of emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence
sounded, in the ears of many, as just the right thing needed in the workplace. The older history
of failures in psychology to measure social intelligence had been forgotten (Kihlstrom &
Cantor, 2000), and emotional and social intelligence were just assumed to be synonyms, more
or less. 
Meanwhile, the group of psychologists who had originated the concept of EI refined their
performance measures. The first version of their test was subjected to criticism (Davies,11
Stankov, & Roberts, 1998). It did not seem that the performance measures of emotional
abilities converged, after all, and there were grave difficulties in defining what are correct
answers to many of the items. The most simple and most often used way to define correct
answers is by taking the modal response in a group of subjects, but that solution sounds
suspicious to many. Is it really true or reasonable that what most people believe is correct?
Psychologists are not used to preaching that message in their classes. On the contrary, it is a
standard trick in psychology text books to exhibit a number of folk  ￿wisdoms ￿ which all seem
credible but are contradictory. 
However, it may be possible to define consensus as the correct answer. People are experts on
how they feel, so the average judgment of mood or emotional state would be both a consensus
and an expert criterion, at the same time. Having realized this, I devised a simple design
where the subjects first judged their current and habitual mood, using a scheme developed in
the 1970's and since then employed with success many times (Sjöberg, Svensson, & Persson,
1979). Then, they were asked to estimate, or guess, the mood, current and habitual, of the
other subjects present and taking part in the same test session. Emotion knowledge was scored
by taking the absolute differences between guessed mood of others, and actually observed
mood of others (arithmetic means). This process was used in three sessions of testing, in
1999, 2000 and 2001 (Sjöberg, 2001a, 2001b). The emotion knowledge scores obtained in
this way correlated to some extent with other measures of emotional intelligence. 
In 2002, we analyzed a new set of data and it then dawned upon me that there were three more
ways of scoring the mood data. Possibly, these new ideas can be classified as products of
serendipity. First, taking absolute differences between own mood and mean mood of the
group constituted the basis of measuring deviant emotional reactions. Several analyses
revealed this to be quite an interesting new aspect of emotional life, and actually a stronger
correlate of such variables as performance EI or social adjustment, than the original emotion
knowledge scores.  
There were two more ways of scoring the data. First, guessed mood of others could be related
to the mean guesses given by the people in the group. This would be a score of how
idiosyncratic, or  ￿normal ￿, the guesses given by any one person were. In other words, did they
think about moods and mood changes in the same way as others did? Second, did their current
mood coincide with what people guessed it would be? This could be scored by comparing
current mood and the mean guessed mood. We can think of this score as predictability. If the
two are close, people have reacted the way others thought they would react. Table 1
summarizes the four types of scoring.12
Table 1. The four different possibilities of scoring actual and guessed mood.
Target of comparison
Mean actual mood Mean guessed mood
Type of
mood rating







3. Emotion knowledge 4.  ￿Normality ￿ of
conceptions about emotional
reactions
Summing up, it was scoring variation number 3 that started our interest in these data. We
found much later that variation number 1 seemed even more fruitful. Variations 2 and 4 may
serve as starting points for further research and the construction of new scales. They are quite
different, in fact. One measures if a person has notions about emotional reactions which are
typical for a group, or if he wanders off in a jungle of idiosyncratic thoughts about emotions.
The other measures if a person reacts emotionally in predictable ways. 
It should be noted that it took three years for me to come to think of all the four scoring
possibilities of the mood data. They were initially only devised to make it possible to score
emotion knowledge. Will these new ideas lead to some interesting new research? Both
variations 2 and 4 could be interesting as starting points for thesis work, and they would
perhaps provide new angles on emotional intelligence. 
Example 3: Checking it
Here is an approach that is almost certain to give good results. Maybe it is not sufficient for a
thesis but it could in many cases lend itself to a good start on one. 
Psychology is full of half-truths. The student who is starting up a research career has usually
read mostly text-books and such books usually do not go into details behind their assertions.
They may refer to some classical papers and perhaps more current reviews, but they do not go
into the details of research which allegedly support their notions. It is often very rewarding to
check these details. Do the papers cited in reviews really say what the reviewer says they do,
and how strong is the evidence in fact? It will be a surprise to the student to discover that
prominent researchers may cite strange  ￿evidence ￿ in support of their points, such as other
papers which present no new empirical results but merely repeat what others have said
already, or papers which do not build on empirical data at all but on simulations. Simulations
may have an interest, but hardly as support for an empirical thesis. In addition, there is the old
problem of significance versus size of effects, see Sjöberg (Sjöberg, 2003a) for an example
and a detailed discussion. Students should be wary of the many cases when empirical findings
are based on very small effects, small but  ￿significant ￿. What should one do, really, with
effects of a few percent explained variance? More and more researchers realize that
significance testing is only a first step in establishing a finding, it must also reveal a large
effect. Small effects could be due to artefacts, and so could large effects but in those cases the
risk is smaller. 13
Going back to the evidence could carry a thesis a long way. A recent example is described in a
paper by Elisabeth Loftus (Loftus & Guyer, 2002a, 2002b). She was interested in the question
if sexual abuse in childhood could give rise to repressed memories which would later, in
adulthood, be brought back to consciousness. A paper by Corwin and Olafson (Corwin &
Olafson, 1997) seemed to demonstrate such a phenomenon in a very forceful and reliable
manner. They had interviewed a girl when she was six and had allegedly been subjected to
sexual abuse by her mother, and who later had forgotten all about it when she was interviewed
once more, ten years later. When shown the original taped interview she came to remember
the abuse. Corwin had then shown the tapes to a number of prominent researchers, and they
had written papers testifying to their conviction that the case was one of real, documented
repression. Only one of the researchers was skeptical. This was a sensation because such
repression had previously not been that clearly documented, in spite of its being the basis of
many court cases and the subject of long, intense controversy in forensic psychology (Holmes,
1990; Holmes, 1994), see Sjöberg (Sjöberg, 2000-01) for a dramatic Norwegian murder case
where a person was convicted on the basis of the alleged return of repressed memory.
Loftus got the idea to track down the people involved in the case, such as the mother of the
girl, several doctors and so on. When she did that, she found that the case description was
misleading in the sense that many important details had been either left out or had been
described in a quite misleading fashion. She also found that it was highly dubious if the girl
had really forgotten the events in the time interval between the two sets of interviews. She
was said to have talked about the events in the interval. How could she then have forgotten
them? 
It is not the intention here to go further into this case or the  ￿ memory wars ￿  debate, although
it is a goldmine of questionable science (Crews, 1995). I simply want to point out that it may
be a good idea to do detailed study of the evidence for assertions made by researchers.
Researchers are human beings and as such they are rarely unbiased. They want to support a
thesis of one kind or another and they often present biased cases where important details are
left out or depicted in a misleading manner. Journals may publish such work because editors
and reviewers are human beings, too, and have limited resources available to check in detail
all the assertions made in a manuscript. For example, a reviewer of a manuscript rarely will
check original sources cited in a paper to find out if they really say what the author of the
manuscript asserts. The reviewer may react, but only if he or she has already read those
sources, not otherwise. The reviewer will also very seldom have the chance to check the
empirical work carried out. Errors in calculations may occur more often than expected. To-
day the arithmetic work is done by computers, but errors in entering data and specifying
details of the statistical analysis are not unheard of. Such errors can be the cause of what
appears to be interesting, unusual or remarkable results.  
Example 4: Reading fiction to get ideas 
Fiction is a truly enormous field of creative production and many sharp psychological
insights. There is a whole academic field devoted to the analysis of fiction, and we shall not
go into it. Instead, my suggestion is to look for ideas in good, or even bad, books. The result
may be quite interesting. 8. The background has some interest. We were invited to contribute a review paper on risk
perception with reference to the railways who were just then starting up a new high-speed train
service in Sweden. In the course of working on that paper (Drottz-Sjöberg & Sjöberg, 1991) we came
across the Sandsjö accident in 1864.
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An example is afforded by a novel which has become a  ￿cult ￿ book, viz. Rhinehart ￿s  ￿ Dice
Man ￿  (Rhinehart, 1971). The idea is as simple as it is intriguing. A person makes a pact with
himself that he will first specify his options, perhaps six of them, then roll a die, and then he is
committed to carry out the act which the die  ￿decides ￿ for him. What would be the result of
such  ￿die living ￿? Would it be beneficial, or would it on the contrary lead to disaster? How
about some research on those who have tried it, or are willing to do so? The story is about
breaking through various inhibitions. 
Here is another idea, which occurred to me when I testified in the Norwegian murder case
mentioned above. The suspect had been enticed by the interrogating police officer to write a
short story describing the murder and the feelings accompanying it. The suspect had no
memory of having committed the murder but he complied with the suggestion. He was, as it
turned out, a person with some literary talent. He wrote a short story which was quite
convincing, both to the police and later to the court, and even to himself. He started to
 ￿remember ￿! He even formally confessed to having committed the very brutal act involved
(and later retracted the confession, but it was still believed by the courts). My idea was the
following. This young Norwegian boy had literary talent. A good author can write as if he has
actually experienced a set of events, as if he is guilty of a crime for example. Take
Dostoevsky. His  ￿ Crime and punishment ￿   is a masterpiece, and surely gives the impression
that the author has lived through these or similar events. Are people who read such stories
convinced that fantasy is not enough to produce them? How does the impression arise that a
piece of fiction is reality? The same question can be asked about the theater or movies.
Hollywood has today enormous skill in making all sorts of impossible events seem very real.
Is the illusion in fact a destructive force, making people believe in all sorts of superstitions
and losing contact with reality?
Example 5: Historical case studies 
In our risk research program we happened to learn about the first major railway accident in
Sweden
8 (Sjöberg & af Wåhlberg, 1996). One of the many interesting insights afforded by that
work was the lack of demands to phase out the railways. After all, about ten people had been
crushed to death and many more injured. Should such a dangerous technology really be
retained? Look at what happened in Sweden in 1979, after the TMI nuclear accident. People
were quite determined to phase out nuclear power. (They didn ￿t but that is another story). 
It then struck me that a major factor might be if a technology is seen as substitutable or not.
Nuclear power can be substituted with other technologies for producing electricity. Railways
constituted a quantum leap in transportation technology in 1864. There was no comparable9. There is a common misconception that new technology is perceived as risky just because it
is new. We find no such reactions in current research, and in the case study of the Sandsjö accident
we found no negative attitudes against railways per se, only criticism of conditions which were partly
responsible for the accident. 
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alternative in terms of speed, comfort and cost. Railways opened up the world
9. 
To test the notion of substitutability, I studied attitudes to technology in three dimensions:
global attitude (good-bad), whether too much attention was devoted to the risks of a
technology, or too little, and whether the technology should be phased out or its use allowed
to expand. These attitudes were related to explanatory variables: voluntariness, novelty,
substitutability, risk and benefit. The results for 4 technologies are given in Table 2. The data
were collected from a quasi-representative sample of the Swedish population (Sjöberg,
Hansson, Boholm, Peterson, & Fromm, 2002), N=294.
Table 2. Regression analysis results (standardized regression coefficient) for four










- Genetically modified food -
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0.069 -0.073 0.044 -0.160** 0.503*** 0.404
Phase out vs.
expand -0.086 0.065 0.147* -0.079 0.197** 0.092
- Nuclear power - 
Global




0.027 -0.018 0.037 -0.198** 0.449*** 0.374
Phase out vs.
expand 0.137** -0.091 0.421*** -0.074 0.227*** 0.522
- Cellular telephones - 
Global
attitude -0.051 -0.002 0.117* -0.421*** 0.269*** 0.373Table 2. Regression analysis results (standardized regression coefficient) for four
















0.078 -0.149* 0.115 -0.042 0.318*** 0.168
Phase out vs.
expand 0.016 -0.022 0.265*** -0.224*** 0.190** 0.249
- Pesticides -
Global




0.226*** -0.011 0.209*** -0.115 0.252*** 0.324
Phase out vs.
expand 0.045 -0.040 0.374*** -0.086 0.217*** 0.324
It seems that the idea is workable. Substitutability works the way we expected, and contributes
in an important manner to explaining variation in attitudes toward the technologies
10. Is this
type of research of any importance? I think it is. The social and political problems of risk
management are enormous and they are partly psychological. Understanding attitude
dynamics in cases like this provides a platform for management. Let ￿s look more closely at
another historical example. 
A special case: a good bad idea
My prime example here is from risk research, and the seminal work by Starr (Starr, 1969).
Starr was the first to analyse risk acceptability of technologies in relation to benefits. He
found, as might have been expected, a strong relationship at the aggregate level. The more
benefits, the higher the accepted (or actually existing) risk levels. Yet, technologies seemed to
form two groups which he termed voluntary and involuntary risks. Examples would be driving
your own car (voluntary) or riding in a bus (involuntary). The level of accepted risk was about
ten times larger in the former case. 
These were interesting findings which came to be the basis of a whole new field of social
science risk research. Several researchers jumped on the band wagon. It was especially17
attractive to do so because Starr was clearly wrong in one important sense. Voluntariness was
not really a good way of interpreting the findings. What is  ￿involuntary ￿ about riding a bus?
Several alternatives seemed to fit better to our intuitions, such as  ￿ control ￿ . Be that as it may,
and the debate is still going on (Sjöberg et al., 2002), the important point is that Starr had hit
upon a gold mine of interesting and important problems, and that it was obvious that things
needed to be improved upon. Therefore, his achievement was very fruitful. It was a  ￿good bad
idea ￿. There are many other examples. The crucial point is that a fruitful new field is defined,
and that other researchers can see how they can contribute.
More examples of not-so-good ideas
In the present section, I develop a few examples of ideas that are unlikely to lead to successful
research. Three different types of bad ideas are identified. 
Example 1: Personality
It is quite common that students want to study a phenomenon in relation to  ￿personality ￿. The
reason is probably at least partly  ￿the fundamental attribution error ￿, i. e. the tendency to
interpret the behavior of others in terms of their enduring traits and dispositions 
(Jones & Nisbett, 1970-71). The mistake here is that personality has never been found to
account for more than a minor fraction of behavior, in spite of all the convictions to the
contrary, and  ￿common sense ￿ (Mischel, 1968). People vary from one situation to the other.
These weaknesses are true of all work on personality, including trait and typology approaches,
but typologies are worse than trait approaches. It is very tempting to think in terms of
typologies, and much has been written about various approaches, starting in Antiquity and the
famous four temperament types of Empedocles and Hippocrates (Adams, 1972). This way of
thinking is the basis of some current lucrative commercial applications (Sjöberg, 2000b). The
problem with typologies is that people differ, yes, but not in such a simple manner that they
can be classified into a small number of types. It is always found that only a few extreme
people fit the typological scheme, all others are  ￿mixed types ￿. 
Example 2: A criterion defined scale
In our work on EI we have found only modest relationships between performance based
measures and self-report scales. These findings are similar to the experience of several other
researchers. They are problematic because they throw some doubts on the validity of the
concept, as it is currently operationalized. I did, however, have very extensive data and they
could possibly be used to discover any systematic relationships between the two sets of
concepts, or so I thought. 
Over 1000 self-report items were available in two data sets, together with a performance
measure based on judgments of emotions in vignettes describing social problem situations.
The latter were scored according to a consensual scoring key, i. e. the most common response
was scored as  ￿correct ￿. I then correlated each of the 1000+ self-report items with the
performance score in one sample, and found 85 items which correlated significantly. The
sample was of modest size, N=41, so fairly high correlations were required to pass as18
 ￿significant ￿. These 85 items were subjected to item analysis and had an excellent internal
consistency reliability, above 0.9 in terms of Cronbach ￿s alpha. The total score based on the
85 items correlated 0.7 with performance based EI! Looking at the individual items they were
heterogenous but I thought I could see some psychological commonalities in them...
Before establishing the  ￿scale ￿, however, a necessary check was a cross validation on a new
sample. I had such a sample, N=190. The  ￿scale ￿ turned out to have a lower alpha in the new
sample, 0.7, but still fairly respectable. However, when correlating the  ￿scale ￿ with EI
performance, validity dropped to 0.1! Hence, it was all just a way of capitalizing on chance.
The 85 items which had respectable correlations with EI performance in the first sample did
so just because of random errors, apparently. When many, many tests of significance are
made, some are bound to come out as  ￿significant ￿, just due to random errors. The test using
cross validation is very simple and easy to understand, and quite necessary. A  ￿shrinkage ￿ is
always to be expected, although I was surprised to see how important it was in the present
case. 
It should be added that even if the  ￿scale ￿ had held up under cross validation, it would have
been of doubtful value. Items selected in this way tend to be heterogenous and make little
psychological sense. They may be useful for prediction but lead to no improved
understanding.
Example 3: Job satisfaction
People who like their jobs perform better and more, yes? The answer is no, they don ￿t. There
are literally hundreds of studies which show that people who like their jobs don ￿t perform
more, or better (Iaffaldano & Muchinsky, 1985). Once this is pointed out, it seems obvious,
like so much else. I may like my job just because it does not demand too much from me.
Performance is a different thing, related to the will to work (Björklund, 2001; Sjöberg & Lind,
1994), which is entirely different from job satisfaction.  
The bad idea involved here is repeating the basic study over and over again. It seems so
attractive that people who like their jobs should also perform better, and Hackman and
Oldham suggested theory of job motivation (Hackman & Oldham, 1976) which was based on
this idea. According to them, certain job characteristics create job satisfaction (true) and also
higher performance (false). There was a big political investment in this line of thinking, which
may explain why so many studies were carried out, in spite of repeated failures.
How good ideas differ from not-so-good ideas
The not-so-good ideas have some properties in common. First, they are not developed on the
basis of current research, but on common-sense notions. 
Second, they are not motivated by true research interest but by something else, such as interest
in psychotherapy. There is nothing wrong with that kind of interest, it just is not research
interest. 
Third, they contain little in the way of intellectual challenge, and thereby also little promise19
for further development, or arousing the interest of other researchers. 
Fourth, they involve the repetition of old ideas that have already been tried and found more or
less useless. 
Negating these properties by no means guarantees that one has a good idea. For example,
there may be intellectual challenge in an idea, still no really interesting empirical applications.
It is only by trying out ideas in practice that we can decide if they are really good. 
In my experience, such trials very often bring in new and unexpected aspects, which then, in
turn, may be useful for further research. The research process should take place in interaction
with the empirical data and new ideas are, in the ideal case, formed on the basis of unexpected
results. This is very natural and in a way simple. One just has to have an open mind and look
for the unexpected.
The received view of the research process is that it is or should be a question of hypothesis
testing. Hypotheses should be derived from theory, hence research should be about testing
theories. What is wrong with that?
The mistake is the implicit assumption that there are many very interesting theories and that
all research should be geared towards testing them. Psychology does not yet have many
interesting theories. We need ideas about phenomena and empirical principles, and in a later
phase there will be theories. Research needs to be explorative and hypotheses must be very
tentative. 
How do I get good ideas?
This is a question about creative problem finding and problem solving (Runco & Chand,
1995). Much has been written about the topic, and it is at the present not fully understood.
Guilford is famous for having awoken interest in creativity in a presidential address to the
American Psychological Association in 1950 (Guilford, 1950). Before that time, there was
very little psychological research on the topic, maybe partly because the field was dominated
by behaviorism and animal models. Rats are not creative - the topic just does not arise. It is
now 50 years since Guilford ￿s address and there is more work on creativity, but it is still a
relatively neglected area (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). 
One of the best ideas that Guilford had was that of divergent thinking (Guilford, 1975). A
major point is the notion that criticism should be suspended in the phase of generating many
ideas, most of which are later to be deleted. The few really good and original ideas are kept.
People vary greatly in how good they are at producing many ideas. Some tricks may help,
though. A simple approach is to use random input, such as random words or pictures. Most of
these methods are probably not well suited for generating research ideas, however. Let ￿s take
a closer look at that particular problem.
Simple, everyday problems call for  ￿quick and dirty ￿ fixes. What would be a good Christmas
gift for a person I know? Or what should we serve for dinner to people we have invited? Or
what should I wear for that party I am invited to? Answers to such questions require creative20
handling of a mixture of general cultural knowledge and idiosyncratic knowledge about
particular people, places and situations. Research is different, in different ways for different
disciplines. Psychology certainly is related to general cultural knowledge, and it may be
related to knowledge about particular people known to the researchers, or maybe people he or
she has read about, or seen in movies. But mainly, the substrate to develop is found in the
research literature. The way to get ideas is therefore to read relevant previous work, and to do
so with an open and critical mind. Given that the researcher has this pertinent and relevant
knowledge he or she can start to generate ideas. 
Although trait approaches have had only very limited success generally, it should be
mentioned that there are some personality factors of importance for creativity. An important
factor in creativity is intellectual openness, one of the factors in the five-factor model of
personality (McCrae & Costa, 1987). A negative factor is perfectionism and compulsive
orderliness. Creative people are relatively low in two other factors: conscientiousness and
sociability. They develop in their own directions of work and often do so by themselves, not
seeking the cooperation of others. They tend to be introverted at times. They also tend to be
emotionally unstable. All these negative characteristics must not be too pronounced, of
course, because they then will be obstacles to creative performance. 
Good ideas may be found in many places, in case you don ￿t produce them yourself. There is a
saying:  ￿If you want to get a new idea, read an old book ￿. This is absolutely right. A discipline
such as psychology has a short memory. Maybe this is so because many researchers entertain
an illusion of complete and perfect cumulation of knowledge in the field. Current versions of
anything are then necessarily compilations of all that is good in previous work, adding some
new notions. But reading old books also gives a valuable perspective on just how slow
progress in our field is. An example: the first book in Swedish on witness psychology was
published in 1933 by Arvid Wachtmeister (Wachtmeister, 1933). It is an excellent piece of
work, in good contact with German and French work from the first decades of the 20
th century
and with many interesting case studies and shrewd insights into the intricate problems of
human testimony in court. Yet, it seems to be completely forgotten to-day, and so is most of
the German and French extensive research on witness psychology as well. Surely, anyone who
wants to do research in forensic psychology could get  ￿new ￿ ideas from this text and the work
that it cites. 
Managing creative research
Consider now how creative research should be managed. Researchers are oriented towards
their own world of ideas. These ideas may or may not have practical applications. Important
practical applications require innovative research. The problem in managing creativity is that
managers want quick fixes, and are suspicious of researchers. They suspect that researchers
have a good time and enjoy themselves, and get paid for it. This is somehow wrong. Work
should be a burden, as apparently was the belief of people of my school who conducted a
survey about graduate students ￿ attitudes. They never even asked whether the students enjoyed
being creative. 
We find these counter-creative forces at work everywhere in applied research. The great
successes of such work illustrate the exact opposite. Swedish pharmaceutics company Hässle21
was enormously successful under the leadership of Ivan Östholm (Östholm, 1995). Östholm
was not a researcher himself, but he was sensitive to the needs of the academic researchers he
commissioned to work. Their most famous achievement was Losec, the world ￿s most
successful drug and an enormous commercial success story. What were the needs of the
researchers? It was to be sponsored for doing basic research and to publish in reputable
journals. This was the way for them to make a career, not with Hässle but in the academic
community. The arrangement worked enormously well, but it seems that few have been
influenced by this lesson. I suppose the message is too alien to most managers. Swedish
Government authorities do sponsor social science research, but they demand compliance to
fuzzy programs which seem to be geared towards discouraging basic research. This is
counterproductive. They will not get the best researchers to apply, and they will not get
cutting-edge research results. 
The Losec case illustrates the importance of intrinsic motivation. A large amount of research
has shown that extrinsic orientation towards rewards such as money will be detrimental to
creativity (Amabile, 2000; Amabile, Collins, Conti, & Phillips, 1996). Part of the problem
may be that managers do not require the right kind of achievement. For example, if a
university or college does not reward its professors for publishing internationally, many of
them will not do so. It is hard and often frustrating to try to compete in the international arena.
Why do it if not required? This attitude is even worse for the graduate student who will not
learn in time the tricks of the trade. He or she will be pursuing what can be called a local
career, if that strategy is encouraged. As noted above, the result is that meaning is lost.
Research must contribute to the international community or it is a waste of time and money.
The main force creating good ideas is intellectual excitement and emotional support from the
environment. It takes time, of course, to get the really good ideas and all of them will not hold
up under empirical testing. However, a highly critical and competitive attitude in the
environment will kill many ideas even before they are hatched. The very process of deepening
the ideas, and shaping them to fit realities is interrupted or not even started. Many academic
environments are like this. Doctoral students may begin to look upon each other as
competitors (a very tempting and natural thing to do), and if their thesis advisers are pursuing
the Holy Grail of Perfection, very little will come out of many years of work. The climate in a
research team needs to be accepting and strongly encouraging, and criticism must be dealt
with in a very delicate manner. 
It is possible that a multicultural environment is fruitful (Ducker & Tori, 2001). However,
there is no guarantee for that in psychology, because most research in our discipline is
culturally mute. It is also possible that gender plays a role in psychological research, but I
don ￿t believe much in that possibility. Women tend perhaps to choose different fields of study
than men do, but I see no tendency for them to think and do research in different ways. There
is no female way of knowing which is different from the male one, not in scientific research.
(There may be in everyday social and emotional knowledge, but that is another story). 
Success or failure?
Why opt for a research career? I assume that the goal is to be successful in research, which22
means many things. It means getting and developing good ideas, which turn out to work
empirically. Do good ideas, and original ideas, lead to fame and international recognition? By
no means. There is a lot more required.
The main route to recognition is international publications in the leading journals in the
specialty. It is easy to locate those journals, not easy to have papers accepted by them. Let me
first say a few words about the orientation of the journals. 
There are two groups: general psychology journals and journals specialized according to
interdisciplinary contents. Risk research, to take that example once more, can be published in
general psychology journals such the European Psychologist or the Journal of Applied Social
Psychology. I call these general journals because they specify their orientation in terms of
scientific discipline, not contents. Then there are journals which are interdisciplinary and
specialize in risk, such as Risk Analysis or the Journal of Risk Research. These journals are
about risk, but many disciplines are represented, and not only social or behavioral science,
also natural science, engineering and medicine. The people who read them do so because they
have a professional investment in risk matters. Psychologists who read psychology journals
are rarely interested in risk questions. Hence, to get interested readers, the journals
specializing in the substance of research are to be clearly preferred. The exception is the
researcher who is strongly bent on theoretical and basic scientific work, here it may be
appropriate to try for the best psychology journals. My own experience confirms strongly that
the specialized journals are to be preferred in other cases, if you want to get interested readers. 
All this talk about journals is essential for the young researcher because funding of research
projects, and appointments to desirable jobs in universities, are based more and more on
journal publication achievements. This is the way it should be, because one must break the
local in-group dynamics, in which local reports or books are all that is required. There are still
environments like that in Scandinavian universities but they fight a losing battle. Psychology
in Sweden turned decidedly international in its orientation in the 1960's and a recent
evaluation of psychology and other disciplines in major research nations showed it to do quite
well (May, 1997).
There are excellent handbooks about writing manuscripts for scientific journals, most notably
the APA publication manual (American Psychological Association, 2001). They tell you to
write clear, short papers which stand a chance of being accepted. The chance is still small, of
course. But even if it is only 5 percent, or less, it is still quite possible to succeed, provided
many attempts are made (Sjöberg, 2003b). The student must develop a thick skin and not be
discouraged by many failures. Everybody fails, including experienced professors. Also, the
letters from editors should be carefully read. A paper is almost never accepted without
revision. What looks like failure may simply mean that the editor wants a revision and then is
ready to accept the paper.
When a journal is selected, it is a good idea to look closely at the kind of papers they have
recently been publishing lately. You may even find some interesting pieces of work that you
had missed. You will get a feeling for the flair of the journal, the style they use, and the kind
of topics they deal with. If your own list of references already lists a number of papers from
that journal, you have probably made the right choice. 23
Discussion and conclusions
Several  topics of this paper have been rather seldom discussed. This is a bit strange, because
judgments are made all the time on how good or bad ideas are, e.g. by selection committees
for psychology chairs or by committees working for research councils in assessing
applications for funding. There seems to be very little reflection in these circles on just what it
is that they are judging. There may indeed be great variation in judgments. Also, there seems
to be little reflection and discussion about how to create and sustain a creative social climate
in a research group. 
The present paper succeeds if it manages to stimulate some of its readers towards fruitful
reflection on their research, and on ways to renew their approaches. That remains to be seen,
of course. The ideas of the paper may be correct, still it may fail to induce the right mind set
for fruitful research. Or the ideas may be simply wrong. Perhaps very different criteria could
be applied to decide if an idea is good or bad, and perhaps the present notions will not be
helpful in generating good ideas.
It is obvious that ideas cannot be commanded. They come or they do not come. I have tried to
show in this paper that getting ideas is a matter of openness. This is largely a question of
attitude and hence not too hard to change. It all boils down to taking in as much information
as possible, and forming a network of inter-related associations. The process takes time, and
cannot be done as an ordinary job. It is a question of  ￿the stream of interests ￿, of relating and
integrating various parts of life into one or several themes which should then start to interact,
strengthen each other and give rise to new themes. It is not really hard, but it takes time and
commitment, and openness. 
It was noted in the introduction that only 20 percent of the graduate students in social sciences
in Sweden ever manage to finish with a Ph. D. This is true for psychology as well. What are
the reasons? A reform of graduate study back in 1969 was based on the complaint that those
who finished with a Ph. D. degree were as old as 40 years. The Government set about to do
something about that and a very extensive program of reform was launched. Thirty-three years
later the age of finishing students was even a few years more than it was in 1969. Almost no
assessment was made of the reform until 1996, and virtually nobody discussed what could be
wrong with it. In 1996 the National Audit Office finally did assess the reform and found it to
have utterly failed [Riksrevisionsverket (Swedish National Audit Office), 1996]. Average
time to complete graduate education was about 10 years in the 1960's, and so it was in the
1990's. The question is why the reform failed.
The National Audit Office stressed primarily the economic side and suggested that more11. Conditions varied, and many of the students receiving these scholarships also had to fulfill
some teaching and administration duties. There seem to be no data available on how common this
was, and how large a fraction of full time was involved. 
12. Another suggestion concerned continuity of supervision, which they found to be in
conflict with supervisors ￿ own need for time free from all teaching duties. I concentrate here on the
major factor, the economic one. 
13. At the time of writing (May 2003) another follow-up has been commissioned and it will
presumably report on the results of the 1998 reform. A report is due in the end of 2003. 
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students should get the chance to pursue full-time
11 graduate work
12. The recommendation
was presumably based on the fact that students themselves argued that the major obstacle to
completing graduate work was inadequate economic support. However, there was no analysis
of whether completion or time to completion was related to financial support. Having seen
several failures in spite of generous economic support, I was skeptical about this strong
emphasis on economics. Maybe it is a contributing factor, but there must surely be several
others. 
In 1998 a reform of graduate education was implemented. It was now required that all new
graduate students should have a guarantee of full economic support for 4 years and that
universities should carefully monitor their progress and see to it that they received adequate
supervision. Since the total resources were not radically increased, this meant that much fewer
students could be admitted and that, in turn, made it hard to carry through the usual program
of doctoral courses. Was this reform - surely well-meaning - really what was needed? How
important are economic resources
13? Nobody seems to know.
However, it is hardly likely that economic factors are sufficient to alone bring about the
desired increased completion rates and decreased study times. Let me suggest a few other
themes which may be of relevance. 
1. If 80% drop out, 20% actually get their Ph.D. How do they manage? Is it because they had
especially competent thesis advisers, or that the process of research guidance involved very
close monitoring of their work and integration into research teams? Or were they people with
particularly high talent,  motivation and creativity? If the latter is true, it is possible that
improvements require new selection procedures rather than new supervision principles or,
possibly, both. However, how should one go about selecting students? Extensive experience
with psychological tests is not encouraging (Sternberg & Williams, 1997).
2. In some other countries, perhaps especially the USA, things seem to function much better
than in Sweden. Or is this an illusion, something merely true of the leading US universities? It
would be interesting to have some discussion about this, and to learn whether US principles of
graduate education are in fact better. Swedish experience is limited when it comes to the
establishment of elite institutions, in spite of resources being available, in principle, for doing
so (Sjöberg, 1999c).25
3. The article does not discuss the role of the public critical discussion of the thesis, in
Swedish "disputation" or Public Defense. This is a traditional custom still upheld in Sweden.
Even if almost nobody fails that test, it is a considerable emotional burden for most students.
Maybe some less dramatic procedure could speed up the process and also increase output
from graduate education. I am thinking of the UK system. In addition, the printed version of
the thesis would be finalized after the final scrutiny, not before it, and the resulting thesis
would be improved. 
4. The long delay and the enormous drop-out may be caused by thesis work, or course work,
or both. It is possible that some parts of course work (which usually requires about half of the
stipulated time) should be devoted to courses directly aimed at supporting the students'
research, such as courses about publishing articles in international journals. I am aware that
some courses already have aims in this general direction, but more could be done. 
5. Delay and drop-out could also be related to the job market for graduates. Some students
may give up simply because they do not believe they could get a good and well-paid job with
a Ph. D. while they see alternatives with a BA or an MA Others stay on as graduate students
more or less on purpose and wait for one of the very few vacant openings in their department.
Very few want to or can succeed in switching to another department since most departments
give priority to their own people, a very unsound system. Compare here with the US system. If
the Government really wants more Ph. Ds why don't they create jobs for them?
6. There are implicit, sometimes explicit, norms about theses which are contrary to the official
norms. People have not really changed their ideas about thesis work very much since 1969. A
thesis which is done in the stipulated time tends to be scorned, and the thesis adviser loses
face. The adviser who is uncertain about his or her own status and job prospects has little to
lose by increasing the demands on his on her students.
7. Finally, there is ambivalence in the system about ideas and originality. The Government
wants to downplay those aspects and sees graduate education mainly as acquiring certain
skills of applying scientific methods. Somehow, the creative side of research is assumed not to
be important or to take care of itself. Yet, it does exist and the informal norms in many
contexts require creativity from the student. Not least does the student him- or herself require
creativity. Failure and delay are probably often due to the inept handling of this aspect of
graduate work. The student who has his or her very own idea is the one burning with
enthusiasm, for that student research is no  ￿burden ￿and the degree will be finished. 
On the other hand, the supervisor may suggest and formulate both the basic idea and then one
idea after the other in the course of work. This may be helpful and even necessary. The risk is
that the student does not learn to develop creativity, and may even be deterred from doing so,
especially if the supervisor is obviously good at generating interesting ideas. The supervisor
also has career aspirations. He or she may insist on being a co-author, even first author, on
some and all of the papers making up the thesis. This is natural and common practice in many
disciplines, more or less unheard of in others. In the former case, motivational problems may
arise. In the latter case, there may be a relational problem because the supervisor may resent
that the student poses as the originator of ideas that really were the supervisor ￿s, not the
student ￿s. To make things even more interesting, it is frequently hard to decide who was the26
originator of an idea, because several people can have it at the same time, or memory fails
them. Be that as it may, I believe it is good practice to be explicit about these matters, and
bring them up as early as possible. 
The main message of the present article is that (a) all good research, including thesis work, 
requires creativity, and (b) creativity can be taught and stimulated in various ways, some of
which are well known to be effective. This may sound like a trite conclusion, but in the light
of the practice implemented in our university system, and especially in applied research, it is
not. The National Audit Office did a good job in pointing to the problems, but their preferred
solutions were typical for bureaucrats and politicians: very concrete, and probably missing the
most important points having to do with basic psychological processes. Administrators often
seem to favor a view of research and research education as learning and applying certain
 ￿tools ￿. This, too, is necessary, of course - but if you lack ideas about good problems to apply
the tools on, then what is the meaning of the whole enterprise?27
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